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The Maubara fort, a relic of eighteenth century local autonomy and Dutch-
Portuguese rivalry on Timor Introduction
At Maubara, near the central border on the north coast of Timor-Leste (the former Portuguese Timor), stands an unpretentious stone fort.
1 Although visitors to the site sometimes assume it is of Portuguese provenance, the fort, initially completed in 1760, was originally built and occupied by the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) with the agreement of Maubara's rulers. Construction of the fort was just one episode in a long-standing rivalry between the Dutch and the Portuguese in the Timor region dating back to 1613 when they first clashed in their competition for the local sandalwood trade. The fort was also the result of a Timorese principality seeking to profit from that rivalry to improve its own trade and security. The Portuguese conducted trade in the name of their sovereign, whereas the VOC was a private company operating for the remuneration of shareholders. 2 Both sides sought a trade monopoly, but for logistical reasons and to maximise 1 Place names are presented in the archives with a great variety of spelling. Modern equivalents are used for all place names in this article. Portuguese often worked with the Topasses, but from the beginning of the eighteenth century they attempted to bring them under Portuguese leadership. The Portuguese took control of Lifau, but their relationship with the independent-minded Topasses was not always harmonious, as discussed later.
The Maubara fort was designed to enable extension of VOC trade into eastern Timor, but was never a success. The Portuguese and the Topasses provided the Dutch with many challenges in this regard, but there were other factors at work. One was the tension between trade and territory. 3 Although Europeans referred to Timorese rulers as 'kings' (reis, koningen) and their polities as 'kingdoms' (reinos, rijken) the latter term is rather grand for the small, fragile domains they described. I use the term 'principality' instead. By the late eighteenth century both the Dutch and the Portuguese began to refer to Timorese rulers by lesser titles, such as regulo (prince), vorst (prince), or the Malay radja (king), which could also include rulers of lower rank; Hans Timor, 4 In 1800, the Netherlands Indies government assumed the rights and responsibilities of the VOC and maintained sporadic contact with Maubara throughout the first half of the nineteenth century.
Hägerdal, Lords of the land, lords of the sea: Conflict and adaptation in early colonial
In 1861, however, the territory was formally transferred to Portuguese control. Ironically, the Netherlands Indies government relinquished its claim to Maubara during the period that the colonial state was just coming into focus. Why were the Dutch so willing to end their centurylong connection with Maubara at this time? This article utilises Dutch archives, other contemporary documents, Maubara oral traditions and a range of secondary sources to achieve a detailed understanding of the reasons for the Maubara-Netherlands alliance, the resulting Dutch claim to Maubara, the circumstances surrounding erection of the fort, and the reasons for its later abandonment to the Portuguese. In doing so attention is given to how the VOC entered into local trade patterns, its role as protector, its need to maintain prestige, the importance of diplomacy, and the potential conflict between trade and territory. The different ways these matters were approached by the Netherlands Indies government is discussed and attention is also given to traditional political authority in Maubara and how well this was understood by the Dutch at the time. However, before delving into the main issues it may be useful to situate the article into existing historical literature on Timor and to explain the value of micro-histories such as this one.
Maubara is a relatively small part of Timor, but a detailed study of the principality for the period described aids our understanding of Timorese history as, amongst other things, it demonstrates that individual principalities in the eastern half of the island did not become allied or subordinate 5 to the Portuguese at an equal rate. 7 Following the Portuguese relocation of their Timor capital from Lifau to Dili in 1769, the majority of nearby districts soon fell under Portuguese influence.
Maubara, however, opted to retain its alliance with the VOC. Maubara did transfer its loyalties to the Portuguese in 1861, but only at the insistence of its Dutch overlords, who had made their own arrangements with the Portuguese. Maubara clearly had a different experience to other districts of Timor-Leste, but this is not a matter well-known by either foreigners with an interest in the half-island state or even many East Timorese.
One reason for this could be the inattention given to individual districts in the early historiography of Timor. Maubara is mentioned in a number of early Portuguese and Dutch articles and books, many of which are referenced in this article, but those sources are relatively obscure and difficult to access for the general reader. Probably better known and easier to find appears with what amounts to a sub-title that declares, ' [Timor] has been the scene of Portuguese 7 Studies such as this can serve as a reminder that, just as neither East Timor nor West Timor became Portuguese or Dutch territory overnight, the same was true for other areas and the creation of British Malaya and French Indochina, for example, were drawn-out affairs. The authority of his successors has been described as 'often tenuous in the extreme' and genuine colonial rule did not begin until the late nineteenth century. This was also true for the Dutch in the western end of the island and it was not until the first decades of the twentieth century that the two sides could truly claim to be in control of their respective halves of Timor. 9 The best thing we can say of the assertion that the Portuguese dominated East Timor for half a millennium is that the claim is greatly exaggerated. First promoted by the Portuguese, the claim later proved to be a useful political tool in the struggle against the Indonesian occupation (December 1975- Maucatar was then subject to Portuguese authority, albeit via the Topasses in Lifau. An interesting feature of these documents is that not only do they reveal that the land-locked central Timor principality of Maucatar was in intimate contact with coastal Lifau, they also show that
Maucatar had close relations with the principality of Amanuban, far to the west. 12 Maubara also had close contact with other, distant principalities and further study could reveal that such longdistance relationships were more common than presently assumed.
Furthermore, at the time of the negotiations between the Dutch and the Portuguese that led to the transfer of Maubara to the Portuguese, Maucatar was then accepted by both sides as a Dutch responsibility. There was some discussion of Maucatar also being transferred to the Portuguese and the Dutch were keen to take control of Portuguese-claimed Oecusse (present-day OecusseAmbeno); both areas were said to be rarely visited by their supposed European rulers and they 9 had little or no control of the people, but in the end nothing was done. 13 As it transpired, hoofd regent, was stabbed to death by a Portuguese Catholic priest. In the face of these incidents Kupang accepted Maubara's offer to swear loyalty to the VOC, and to capitalise on the alliance Pietersz returned there with gifts of muskets, ammunition, a flag and a stone engraved with the VOC symbol. The latter was erected in front of the hoofd regent's house. Pietersz was also tasked with identifying a place to build a fort. 40 What had just occurred was more than the VOC merely supporting Maubara's opposition to the common foe, the Portuguese. It was, in fact, the establishment of a tribute-trade agreement; a common phenomenon in the eastern archipelago.
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The VOC had become a great power in the region and had assisted Maubara on several occasions before it was presented with the Sikka captives. This should be seen as the offering of tribute with the expectation that the VOC would repay Maubara with protection and further gifts of its own, as indeed happened shortly after.
Meanwhile, a son of the Maubara koning (king) 42 and a son of the tenente coronel (lieutenant colonel) 43 visited Kupang to report the latest developments. One of these was that nearby Liquiçá 40 'Von Plüskow to Mossel, 22-7-1758', VOC 8351, NA.
41 Such arrangements were made not only with relatively simple principalities such as those of Timor; for example, Vos (Gentle Janus, p. 4) cites the case of Palembang, a much larger and wealthier domain in Sumatra, which at around the same time sold tin cheaply to the VOC in return for protection. Although the circumstances were quite different, Vos also interprets this as a tribute relationship. 42 As used here the term koning appears to be equivalent to hoofd regent. 43 The term used in the document is simply tenenty. 56 It is unclear how much the Dutch understood of this seemingly paradoxical system, but it is also unknown if such a system ever operated at Maubara, as discussed later.
Maubara's known oral tradition is unclear on the matter of dual-sovereignty, but it does assert that a division of authority existed there dating back to the arrival of three brothers from the south who showed by various signs that they were the real rulers. One brother went to live at Vatuvou, one to Lauana, and the paramount ruler, who was titled coronel, resided at Guguleur. It is debatable whether the Dutch understood the Maubara political system or not, but the documents they left behind can be challenging for modern researchers. As noted earlier, tenente coronel and others when they visited Kupang and may have frequented that place from time-to-time to make reports, but the long periods spent with the Maubara notables must have given him, and others who served in similar posts, valuable insights to the Timorese political system. It is difficult to imagine that they always misunderstood how things worked.
In a letter from the VOC gouverneur generaal dated 31 December 1762, an order was given to demolish the Maubara fort and return the occupation force to Java 'as no benefit has been produced'. In the event, it seems that the fort was not demolished, but the small force retained there by opperhoofd ter Herbruggen was withdrawn and Maubara then had to defend itself. Maubara the Dutch appear to have realised that they were likely to achieve more costs than profits. Maubara produced beeswax and sandalwood, but the days of great profits to be made from the latter had already passed, as the wood had been systematically stripped from the easily accessible areas and was increasingly difficult to obtain. Although local trade continued, the hope that Maubara would provide a base for extending Dutch control of trade further east was never realised and Maubara received less attention from the Dutch with each passing year. proximity to the new Portuguese capital and reflected that Maubara had never succeeded in facilitating trade with eastern Timor and it was unlikely it ever would; the most van Este was prepared to supply was two muskets, 1,000 musket balls and a barrel of gunpowder. 83 Van Este's response was surely made with regard to potential risks and benefits. The VOC was conscious that in order to assure trade with the many principalities of Timor and other parts of the archipelago it had to maintain its reputation as a reliable ally. Conversely, the VOC was always careful to contain expenditure and was cautious not to get involved in war if possible because, as
Maubara's continued association with the Dutch
Vos puts it, 'not only [were wars] costly, they also had to be won' if VOC prestige was to be maintained. 84 In the case of Maubara, the likelihood of prolonged conflict with the Portuguese and Topasses was obvious and van Este clearly calculated it was not worth the risk. It would have defied VOC principles to have simply abandoned Maubara, but the assistance given was far short of that requested. Dom Caleto continued his fight against Dom Paulo and the Portuguese well into the 1780s and eventually prevailed. Despite the meagre assistance he received, he remained loyal to the Dutch. In 1792, Maubara again sought help from Kupang. On that occasion, the VOC arranged for assistance to be provided secretly through the keizer (emperor) of Amakono (also known as Sonbai). The Dutch were then unsure of their rights in several places in Timor, including Maubara, and they did not wish to openly challenge the Portuguese. They were also attempting to cut costs and did not want any new commitments. 85 In 1794, Dom Caleto died and so did his Hazaart tried to develop agriculture, and recognising Maubara's suitability for coffee and pepper, encouraged their cultivation.
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In 1831, Emanuel Francis was in Timor to prepare a report for the Netherlands Indies government. Of Maubara, he noted that its vorst had authority over 87,000 subjects, 93 and that some Chinese traders from Kupang carried out business there, but that the place was devoid of all supervision and no notice was taken of any Dutch laws or regulations. 94 Nevertheless, it is interesting that the Chinese came from Kupang, as it indicates that trade was still taking place under the Dutch flag. Although no record has been discovered to prove the thesis, it seems likely that private traders from Kupang or other places under Dutch administration were visiting Maubara even during the VOC period, as was commonplace in other places under VOC control or protection. 95 An account from 1836 suggests that there had been some revival in Dutch interest in Maubara, as it was noted as one of only six places on Timor outside Kupang where the 92 'Timor, 1824', Collectie Schneither, no. 131, NA. 93 Kammen (Three centuries, p. 193) observes that the figure is 'impossibly high for Maubara alone', concluding it refers to all the districts the Dutch believed to be subservient to Maubara. In 1862, the population of Maubara was estimated at 3,000 to 4,000; Affonso In 1846, a Dutch ship, Doris, was sent to Maubara to display the flag and to enquire into the production and cost of local coffee. The commander of Doris met the Maubara radja and various lesser nobles, handing the radja gifts of gunpowder, silk, arak and a Dutch flag. The radja asked if the commander had not brought anything for the nobles, as it was the custom since his forefathers' days that all received gifts. The radja produced a VOC document from 1767 to substantiate his claim, but when he learnt there was nothing, some of the gunpowder and arak were shared with the others, the radja declaring he would be ashamed to send them away emptyhanded. A note in the subsequent report shows that the radja was to be informed that in his forefathers' day the gifts bestowed to the nobles were more like trade items to be exchanged for local products. A gift from the government today was a mere courtesy and nothing was expected in return. Meanwhile, the district's annual coffee harvest was reported to be 60 to 100 picul; the price per picul being 20 guilders in silver or a shotgun and two flasks of gunpowder. However, the plants were reported to be neglected and virtually wild. what had to happen first was the Dutch had to explain to the Maubara rulers why they were breaking off their alliance and surrendering Maubara to its old enemies. There are several reasons the fort could have been rebuilt, not the least being that the powerful artillery and explosive shells in common use by the nineteenth century rendered many older structures obsolete. It is also possible that the Dutch re-evaluated the purpose of the Maubara fort. The present fort's shoreline position suggests it was built to protect against naval attack, which become more probable with improvements in naval gunnery in the nineteenth century.
The whole purpose of the Dutch being in Maubara was trade, so presumably the fort would also have been used for storing cargo and a coastal position would have allowed for ease of handling.
Coastal forts of the late eighteenth-early nineteenth century were characteristically built to simple ground plans with emphasis placed on the ability to fire on enemy ships rather than 115 Kammen, Three centuries, pp. 49, 191.
116 VOC 7440, NA. Transcript provided by Hans Hägerdal. The author was unable to consult this file directly as it was unavailable during research for this article.
117 Peter G. Spillett, 'The pre-colonial history of the island of Timor, together with some notes on the Makassan influence in the island' (Museum and Art Gallery of the Northern Territory, Darwin, 1999).
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opposing land-based attacks. 118 A conviction that sea-borne attack was likely could have been a reason for re-building the fort, but it is difficult to understand why the Dutch would have undertaken such a project in the 1840s (as reported to Spillett), as they appear to have virtually abandoned Maubara several years earlier. In the years immediately following the handover to the Portuguese, the fort had a nominal garrison of 30 men 119 and it is possible the fort was re-built at this time, but it seems unlikely, as a Portuguese report from 1870, only nine years after the handover, suggests the fort was then in a rundown condition and was 'defended' by only one rusty cannon, balanced on a couple of rocks. 120 A more recent Portuguese report suggests that the current fort is Dutch, but that it had been restored at some stage by the Indonesians during their occupation of the territory from late 1975 to late 1999. 121 Clearly, more research needs to be done on the probable re-building of the fort.
Conclusion
This article has explored the reasons for the Timorese principality Maubara seeking an alliance with the Dutch and how the differing policies of the VOC and the Netherlands Indies government affected it throughout the century-long relationship. To enter into local trading patterns the VOC offered protection to its allies, but it was cautious to avoid costly commitments, as its main concern was always profits. In an attempt to extend its trading operations in eastern Timor the VOC established an alliance with Maubara and constructed a fort there in 1760. Maubara was a willing partner in these activities as part of an effort to improve its own trade and security. The activities of the VOC's (and Maubara's) Portuguese and Topass rivals always made it difficult for the VOC to achieve its goals on Timor, but when prolonged conflict loomed following the murder of the Kupang opperhoofd, a new VOC gouverneur generaal reversed his predecessor's Maubara policy in order to avoid further expenses. The VOC carefully guarded its reputation as a reliable ally, so it could not simply repudiate its connection to Maubara. Instead, it withdrew its troops from the fort and limited its support to the provision of guns, powder and ammunition. In the following decades, the VOC provided the Maubara rulers with other gifts and in return received beeswax and other products as part of an ongoing tribute-trade relationship, but the VOC's interest in Maubara eventually became merely perfunctory.
The Netherlands Indies government that succeeded the VOC was also interested in profitability, but the contest for trade that had driven its predecessor was eclipsed by new priorities by the second half of the nineteenth century. The Netherlands Indies government showed little interest in Maubara, but as a nascent colonial power it was interested in territorial control. While territory per se was not yet the aim, the government clearly wanted to protect what it already had, even if it meant sacrificing a part to secure the greater whole. In 1859, the Dutch concluded a treaty with the Portuguese that gained them possession of several strategic districts of the Timor region, but to achieve this they bartered their rights to Maubara.
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On 1 April 1861, a ceremony was held at the Maubara fort where the Dutch flag was lowered for the last time and the Portuguese one hoisted in its place, thus ending a Maubara-Netherlands association that had lasted for over 100 years. The Maubara fort remains as a reminder that the land on which it stands was once considered by Europeans to be a Dutch possession while all around it was Portuguese. It is also a reminder of how a voluntary alliance entered into by an autonomous Timorese principality and a Dutch trading company altered over the course of a century: the Timorese principality was stripped of its autonomy and the Dutch merchants evolved into colonial rulers who could consign territories and people at will, such as happened at Maubara in 1861.
